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Abstract. The detection of network flows that send excessive amounts
of traffic is of increasing importance to enforce QoS and to counter DDoS
attacks. Large-flow detection has been previously explored, but the pro-
posed approaches can be used on high-capacity core routers only at the
cost of significantly reduced accuracy, due to their otherwise too high
memory and processing overhead. We propose CLEF, a new large-flow
detection scheme with low memory requirements, which maintains high
accuracy under the strict conditions of high-capacity core routers. We
compare our scheme with previous proposals through extensive theoreti-
cal analysis, and with an evaluation based on worst-case-scenario attack
traffic. We show that CLEF outperforms previously proposed systems in
settings with limited memory.
Keywords: Large-flow detection, damage metric, memory and compu-
tation efficiency
1 Introduction
Detecting misbehaving large network flows5 that use more than their allocated
resources is not only an important mechanism for Quality of Service (QoS) [35]
schemes such as IntServ [6], but also for DDoS defense mechanisms that allocate
bandwidth to network flows [4,23,27]. With the recent resurgence of volumetric
DDoS attacks [3], the topics of DDoS defense mechanisms and QoS are gaining
importance; thus, the need for efficient in-network accounting is increasing.
Unfortunately, per-flow resource accounting is too expensive to perform in the
core of the network [15], since large-scale Internet core routers have an aggregate
capacity of several Terabits per second (Tbps). Instead, to detect misbehaving
flows, core routers need to employ highly efficient schemes which do not require
5 As in prior literature [15, 42], the term large flow denotes a flow that sends more
than its allocated bandwidth.
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them to keep per-flow state. Several approaches for large-flow detection have
been proposed in this context; they can be categorized into probabilistic (i.e.,
relying on random sampling or random binning) and deterministic algorithms.
Examples of probabilistic algorithms are Sampled Netflow [11] and Multistage
Filters [14,15], while EARDet [42] and Space Saving [29] are examples of deter-
ministic approaches.
However, previously proposed algorithms are able to satisfy the requirements
of core router environments only by significantly sacrificing their accuracy. In
particular, with the constraints on the amount of high-speed memory on core
routers, these algorithms either can only detect flows which exceed their as-
signed bandwidth by very large amounts, or else they suffer from high false-
positive rates. This means that these systems cannot prevent the performance
degradation of regular, well-behaved flows, because of large flows that manage
to stay “under the radar” of the detection algorithms, or because the detection
algorithms themselves erroneously flag and punish the well-behaved flows.
As a numeric example, consider that for EARDet to accurately detect misbe-
having flows exceeding a threshold of 1 Mbps on a 100 Gbps link, it would require
105 counters for that link. Maintaining these counters, together with the neces-
sary associated metadata, requires between 1.6 MB and 4MB of state6, which ex-
ceeds typical high-speed memory provisioning for core routers, and would come
at a high cost (for comparison, note that only the most high-end commodity
CPUs approach the 1–4 MB range with their per-core L1/L2 memory, and the
price tag for such processors surpasses USD 4000 [18]).
In this paper we propose a novel randomized algorithm for large flow detec-
tion called Recursive Large-Flow Detection (RLFD). RLFD works by considering
a set of potential large flows, dividing this set into multiple subsets, and then
recursively narrowing down the focus to the most promising subset. This algo-
rithm is highly memory efficient, and is designed to have no false positives. To
achieve these properties, RLFD sacrifices some detection speed, in particular for
the case of multiple concurrent large flows. We improve on these limitations by
combining RLFD with the deterministic EARDet, proposing a hybrid scheme
called CLEF, short for in-Core Limiting of Egregious Flows. We show how this
scheme inherits the strengths of both algorithms: the ability to quickly detect
very large flows of EARDet (which it can do in a memory efficient way), and the
ability to detect low-rate large flows with minimal memory footprint of RLFD.
To have a significant comparison with related work, we define a damage
metric which estimates the impact of failed, delayed, and incorrect detection
on well-behaved flows. We use this metric to compare RLFD and CLEF with
previous proposals, which we do both on a theoretical level and by evaluating the
amount of damage caused by (worst-case) attacks. Our evaluation shows that
CLEF performs better than previous work under realistic memory constraints,
6 The IP metadata consists of source and destination addresses, protocol number, and
ports. Thus, it requires about 16 bytes and 40 bytes per counter for IPv4 and IPv6,
respectively.
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both in terms of our damage metric and in terms of false negatives and false
positives.
To summarize, this paper’s main contributions are the following: a novel,
randomized algorithm, RLFD, that provides eventual detection of persistently
large flows with very little memory cost; a hybrid detection scheme, CLEF, which
offers excellent large-flow detection properties with low resource requirements;
the analysis of worst-case attacks against the proposed large-flow detectors, using
a damage metric that allows a realistic comparison with the related work.
2 Problem Definition
This paper aims to design an efficient large-flow detection algorithm that min-
imizes the damage caused by misbehaving flows. This section introduces the
challenges of large-flow detection and defines a damage metric to compare dif-
ferent large-flow detectors. We then define an adversary model in which the
adversary adapts its behavior to the detection algorithm in use.
2.1 Large-Flow Detection
A flow is a collection of related traffic; for example, Internet flows are com-
monly characterized by a 5-tuple (source / destination IP / port, transport
protocol). A large flow is one that exceeds a flow specification during a period
of length t. A flow specification can be defined using a leaky bucket descriptor
TH(t) = γt + β, where γ > 0 and β > 0 are the maximum legitimate rate and
burstiness allowance, respectively. Flow specifications can be enforced in two
ways: arbitrary-window, in which the flow specification is enforced over every
possible starting time, or landmark-window, in which the flow specification is
enforced over a limited set of starting times.
Detecting every large flow exactly when it exceeds the flow specification, and
doing so with no false positives requires per-flow state (this can be shown by the
pigeonhole principle [38]), which is expensive on core routers. In this paper, we
develop and evaluate schemes that trade timely detection for space efficiency.
As in prior work in flow monitoring, we assume each flow has a unique and
unforgeable flow ID, e.g., using source authentication techniques such as ac-
countable IPs [1], ICING [32], IPA [24], OPT [20], or with Passport [25]. Such
techniques can be deployed in the current Internet or in a future Internet archi-
tecture, e.g., Nebula [2], SCION [44], or XIA [17].
Large-flow detection by core routers. In this work, we aim to design a
large-flow detection algorithm that is viable to run on Internet core routers. The
algorithm needs to limit damage caused by large flows even when handling worst-
case background traffic. Such an algorithm must satisfy these three requirements:
– Line rate: An in-core large-flow detection algorithm must operate at the
line rate of core routers, which can process several hundreds of gigabits of
traffic per second.
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– Low memory: Large-flow detection algorithms will typically access one or
more memory locations for each traversing packet; such memory must be
high-speed (such as on-chip L1 cache). Additionally, such memory is expen-
sive and usually limited in size, and existing large-flow detectors are inade-
quate to operate in high-bandwidth, low-memory environments. An in-core
large-flow detection algorithm should thus be highly space-efficient. Though
perfect detection requires counters equal to the maximum number of simul-
taneous large flows (by the pigeonhole principle [38]), our goal is to perform
effective detection with much fewer counters.
– Low damage: With the performance constraints of the previous two points,
the large-flow detection algorithm should also minimize the damage to honest
flows, which can be caused either by the excessive bandwidth usage by large
flows, or by the erroneous classification of legitimate flows as large flows (false
positives). Section 2.2 introduces our damage metric, which takes both these
aspects into account.
2.2 Damage Metric
We consider misbehaving large flows to be a problem mainly in that they have an
adverse impact on honest flows. To measure the performance of large flow detec-
tion algorithms we therefore adopt a simple and effective damage metric which
captures the packet loss suffered by honest flows. This metric considers both (1)
the direct impact of excessive bandwidth usage by large flows, and (2) the poten-
tial adverse effect of the detection algorithm itself, which may be prone to false
positives resulting in the blacklisting of honest flows. Specifically, we define our
damage metric as D = Dover +Dfp, where Dover (overuse damage) is the total
amount of traffic by which all large flows exceed the flow specification, and Dfp
(false positive damage) is the amount of legitimate traffic incorrectly blocked by
the detection algorithm. The definition of the overuse damage assumes a link at
full capacity, so when this is not the case the damage metric represents an over-
approximation of the actual traffic lost suffered by honest flows. We note that
the metrics commonly used by previous work, i.e., false positives, false negatives,
and detection delay, are all reflected by our metric.
2.3 Attacker Model
In our attacker model, we consider an adversary that aims to maximize damage.
Our attacker responds to the detection algorithm and tries to exploit its transient
behavior to avoid detection or to cause false detection of legitimate flows.
Like Estan and Varghese’s work [15], we assume that attackers know about
the large-flow detection algorithm running in the router and its settings, but have
no knowledge of secret seeds used to generate random variables, such as the de-
tection intervals for landmark-window-based algorithms [12,13,15,16,19,28–30],
and random numbers used for packet/flow sampling [15]. This assumption pre-
vents the attacker from performing optimal attacks against randomized algo-
rithms.
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We assume the attacker can interleave packets, but is unable to spoof legiti-
mate packets (as discussed in Section 2.1) or create pre-router losses in legitimate
flows. Figure 1 shows the network model, where the attacker arbitrarily inter-
leaves attack traffic (A) between idle intervals of legitimate traffic (L), and the
router processes the interleaved traffic to generate output traffic (O) and per-
form large-flow detection. Our model does not limit input traffic, allowing for
arbitrary volumes of attack traffic.
In our model, whenever a packet traverses a router, the large-flow detector
receives the flow ID (for example, the source and destination IP and port and
transport protocol), the packet size, and the timestamp at which the packet
arrived.
Router
(w/ Detector) O
…
Interleaving
…A
…L
Fig. 1: Adversary Model.
3 Background and Challenges
In this section we briefly review some existing large flow detection algorithms,
and discuss the motivations and challenges of combining multiple algorithms
into a hybrid scheme.
3.1 Existing Detection Algorithms
We review the three most relevant large-flow detection algorithms, summarized
in Table 1. We divide large flows into low-rate large flows and high-rate large
flows, depending on the amount by which they exceed the flow specification.
EARDet. EARDet [42] guarantees exact and instant detection of all flows
exceeding a high-rate threshold γh =
ρ
m , where ρ is the link capacity and m
is the number of counters. However, EARDet may fail to identify a large flow
whose rate stays below γh.
Multistage Filters. Multistage filters [14, 15] consist of multiple parallel
stages, each of which is an array of counters. Specifically, arbitrary-window-based
Multistage Filter (AMF), as classified by Wu et al. [42], uses leaky buckets as
counters. AMF guarantees the absence of false negatives (no-FN) and immediate
detection for any flow specification; however, AMF has false positives (FPs),
which increase as the link becomes congested (as shown in Appendix B.2).
Flow Memory. Flow Memory (FM) [15] refers to per-flow monitoring of
select flows. FM is often used in conjunction with another system that specifies
which flows to monitor; when a new flow is to be monitored but the flow memory
is full, FM evicts an old flow. We follow Estan and Varghese [15]’s random
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eviction. If the flow memory is large enough to avoid eviction, it provides exact
detection. In practice, however, Flow Memory is unable to handle a large number
of flows, resulting in frequent flow eviction and potentially high FN. The analysis
in Appendix B.1 shows that FM’s real-world performance depends on the amount
by which a large flow exceeds the flow specification: high-rate flows are more
quickly detected, which improves the chance of detection before eviction.
Table 1: Comparison of three existing detection algorithms. None of them achieve
all desired properties.
Algorithm EARDet AMF FM
No-FP yes no∗ yes
No-FN
low-rate no∗∗ yes no∗
high-rate yes yes yes∗∗∗
Instant detection yes yes yes
∗Appendix B.1 and B.2 show that Flow Memory has high FN and AMF has high FP
for low-rate large flows when memory is limited.
∗∗EARDet cannot provide no-FN when memory is limited.
∗∗∗Flow Memory has nearly zero FN when large-flow rate is high.
3.2 Advantages of Hybrid Schemes
As Table 1 shows, none of the detectors we examined can efficiently achieve no-
FN and no-FP across various types of large flows. However, different detectors
exhibit different strengths, so combining them could result in improved perfor-
mance.
One approach is to run detectors sequentially; in this composition, the first
detector monitors all traffic and sends any large flows it detects to a second
detector. However, this approach allows an attacker controlling multiple flows to
rotate overuse among many flows, overusing a flow only for as long as it takes
the first detector to react, then sending at the normal rate so that remaining
detectors remove it from their watch list and re-starting with the attack.
Alternatively, we can run detectors in parallel: the hybrid detects a flow
whenever it is identified by either detector. (Another configuration is that a flow
is only detected if both detectors identify it, but such a configuration would have
a high FN rate compared to the detectors used in this paper.) The hybrid inherits
the FPs of both schemes, but features the minimum detection delay of the two
schemes and has a FN only when both schemes have a FN. The remainder of
this paper considers the parallel approach that identifies a flow whenever it is
detected by either detector.
The EARDet and Flow Memory schemes have no FPs and are able to quickly
detect high-rate flows; because high-rate flows cause damage much more quickly,
rapid detection of high-rate flows is important to achieving low damage. Com-
bining EARDet or Flow Memory with a scheme capable of detecting low-rate
flows as a hybrid detection scheme can retain rapid detection of high-rate flows
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while eventually catching (and thus limiting the damage of) low-rate flows. In
this paper, we aim to construct such a scheme. Specifically, our scheme will se-
lectively monitor one small set at a time, ensuring that a consistently-overusing
flow is eventually detected.
4 RLFD and CLEF Hybrid Schemes
In this section, we present our new large-flow detectors. First, we describe the
Recursive Large-Flow Detection (RLFD) algorithm, a novel approach which is
designed to use very little memory but provide eventual detection for large
flows. We then present the data structures, runtime analysis, and advantages
and disadvantages of RLFD. Next, we develop a hybrid detector, CLEF, that
addresses the disadvantages of RLFD by combining it with the previously pro-
posed EARDet [42]. CLEF uses EARDet to rapidly detect high-rate flows and
RLFD to detect low-rate flows, thus limiting the damage caused by large flows,
even with a very limited amount of memory.
4.1 RLFD Algorithm
RLFD is a randomized algorithm designed to perform memory-efficient detection
of low-rate large flows; it is designed to scale to a large number of flows, as
encountered by an Internet core router. RLFD is designed to limit the damage
inflicted by low-rate large flows while using very limited memory. The intuition
behind RLFD is to monitor subsets of flows, recursively subdividing the subset
deemed most likely to contain a large flow. By dividing subsets in this way,
RLFD exponentially reduces memory requirements (it can monitor md flows
with O(m+ d) memory).
The main challenges addressed by RLFD include efficiently mapping flows
into recursively divided groups, choosing the correct subdivision to reduce de-
tection delay and FNs, and configuring RLFD to guarantee the absence of FPs.
Recursive subdivision. To operate with limited memory, RLFD recursively
subdivides monitored flows into m groups, and subdivides only the one group
most likely to contain a large flow.
We can depict an RLFD as a virtual counter tree7 (Figure 2(a)) of depth d.
Every non-leaf node in this tree has m children, each of which corresponds to a
virtual counter. The tree is a full m-ary tree of depth d, though at any moment,
only one node (m counters) is kept in memory; the rest of the tree exists only
virtually.
Each flow f is randomly assigned to a path PATH(f) of counters on the vir-
tual tree, as illustrated by the highlighted counters in Figure 2(b). This mapping
is determined by hashing a flow ID with a keyed hash function, where the key is
randomly generated by each router. Section 4.2 explains how RLFD efficiently
implements this random mapping.
7 The terms “counter tree” and “virtual counter” are also used by Chen et al. [9],
but our technique differs in both approach and goal. Chen et al. efficiently manage
a sufficient number of counters for per-flow accounting, while RLFD manages an
insufficient number of counters to detect consistent overuse.
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…
… …
… …
𝑳𝟏𝑳𝟐
𝑳𝒅
𝑳𝟑
flows
(a) Virtual Counter Tree
(Full m-branch Tree)
m counters
flows
(b) A Tree
Branch.
f2 f3 f4 f5 f6f1 fL
f2 f6 fL
THRLFD
𝑳𝟏
𝑳𝟐
(c) Example with 7
flows,
m = 4, and d = 2.
Fig. 2: RLFD Structure and Example.
Since there are d levels, each leaf node at level Ld will contain an average
of n/md−1 flows, where n is the total number of flows on the link. A flow f
is identified as a large flow if it is the only flow associated with its counter
at level Ld and the counter value exceeds a threshold THRLFD. To reflect the
flow specification TH(t) = γt + β from Section 2.1, we set THRLFD = γT` + β,
where T` is the duration of the period during which detection is performed at
the bottom level Ld. Any flow sending more traffic than THRLFD during any
duration of time T` must violate the large-flow threshold TH(t), so RLFD has
no FPs. We provide more details about how we balance detection rate and the
no-FP guarantee in Appendix A.1.
RLFD considers only one node in the virtual counter tree at a time, so it
requires only m counters. To enable exploration of the entire tree, RLFD divides
the process into d periods; in period k, it loads one tree node from level Lk.
Though these periods need not be of equal length, in this paper we consider
periods of equal length T`, which results in a RLFD detection cycle Tc = d · T`.
RLFD always chooses the root node to monitor at level L1; after monitoring
at level Lk, RLFD identifies the largest counter Cmax among the m counters
at level Lk, and uses the node corresponding to that counter for level Lk+1.
Section 5.3 shows that choosing the largest counter detects large flows with high
probability.
Figure 2(c) shows an example with m = 4 counters, n = 7 flows, and d = 2
levels. fL is a low-rate large flow. In level L1, the largest counter is the one
associated with large flow fL and legitimate flows f2 and f6. At level L2, the
flow set {fL, f2, f6} is selected and sub-divided. After the second round, fL is
detected because it violates the counter value threshold THRLFD.
Algorithm description. As shown in Figure 3(a), the algorithm starts at
the top level L1 so each counter represents a child of the root node. At the
beginning of each period, all counters are reset to zero. At the end of each
period, the algorithm finds the counter holding the maximum value and moves
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to the corresponding node, so each counter in the next period is a child of that
node. Once the algorithm has processed level d, it repeats from the first level.
Figure 3(b) describes how RLFD processes each incoming packet. When
RLFD receives a packet x from flow f , x is dropped if f is in the blacklist
(a table that stores previously-found large flows). If f is not in the blacklist,
RLFD hashes f to the corresponding counters in the virtual counter tree (one
counter per level of the tree). If one such counter is currently loaded in memory,
its value is increased by the size of the packet x. At the bottom level Ld, a large
flow is identified when there is only one flow in the counter and the counter value
exceeds the threshold THRLFD. To increase the probability that a large flow is
in a counter by itself, we choose d ≥ dlogm ne and use Cuckoo hashing [33] at the
bottom level to reduce collisions. Once a large flow is identified, it is blacklisted:
in our evaluation we calculate the damage D with the assumption that large
flows are blocked immediately after having been added to the blacklist.
k < d?findmax-valueV.C. Cmax
counters	in	next	
level	represent
Cmax’s child V.C.s
No
period k
ends
reset	
counters;
k	:=	k	+	1
Yes
Cmax
only has one
flow?
Cmax >
threshold?
blacklist
flow	in Cmax
Yes Yes
No No
k :=	1
reset	counters;
counters	represent
1st-level	V.C.s
start
(a) Level Change Diagram.
forward	xpacket	x is in blacklist?
V.C. in
memory?
update	V.C.	
by	size	of	x
No
Yes
Yes
apply policy to
blacklisted flows hash	to	V.C.
(b) Packet Processing Diagram.
Fig. 3: RLFD Decision Diagrams. “V.C.” stands for virtual counter.
4.2 Implementation of Hashing and Counter Checking
Hashing each flow f into a path of virtual counters PATH(f) and checking
whether any of these counters are loaded in the memory are two performance-
critical operations of RLFD.
For each packet, our implementation only requires three bitwise operations
(a hash operation, a bitwise AND operation, and a comparison over 64 bits),
thus requiring only O(1) time8 and O(1) space on a modern 64-bit CPU.
A naive implementation of hashing could introduce unnecessary cost in com-
putation and space. For example, a naive implementation may maintain one hash
function per virtual counter array. To check whether an incoming flow needs to
be monitored, it would have to check whether the incoming flow is hashed into
8 This is not entirely exact, as the length of the hash output has to increase as
O(d logm). However, in any realistic scenario d logm is small enough to be con-
sidered constant.
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every maximum-value counter in each level above the current level. However,
this would take O(d) time for checking level by level and O(d) space for hash
functions, where d is the depth of the virtual counter tree.
|𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏… 𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏	𝟎𝟎𝟎𝟎𝟎…𝟎𝟎𝟎𝟎𝟎𝟎|𝒔 𝒌 −𝟏 bits𝑴(𝑳𝒌) ≜ 𝒔(𝒅 −𝒌 + 𝟏) bits
For 𝑳𝟏|𝒃𝟎𝒃𝟏𝒃𝟐… 𝒃𝒔2𝟏… 𝒃𝒔 𝒌2𝟏 … 𝒃𝒔𝒌2𝟏 …𝒃𝒔𝒅2𝟐 𝒃𝒔𝒅2𝟏|𝑯(𝒇) ≜ For 𝑳𝒌
|𝒂𝟎𝒂𝟏𝒂𝟐…𝒂𝒔2𝟏 …𝒂𝒔 𝒌2𝟐 … 𝒂𝒔 𝒌2𝟏 2𝟏 𝟎𝟎… 𝟎𝟎𝟎|
For 𝑳𝟏𝐀(𝒍𝒊,𝒌) ≜ For 𝑳𝒌2𝟏
𝑯(𝒇)AND 𝑴(𝑳𝒌) = 𝐀(𝒍𝒊,𝒌)≠ 𝐀(𝒍𝒊,𝒌) f’s V.C. is in the loaded counter array 𝒍𝒊,𝒌f’s V.C. is not in the loaded counter array 𝒍𝒊,𝒌
Fig. 4: RLFD Counter Hash and In-memory check. H(f) reflects the hash-
generated bin number for all levels, M(Lk) reflects a mask that includes the
first k − 1 levels, and A(li,k) reflects the bins selected in each of the first k − 1
levels. Flow f is in the i, k counter array exactly when H(f)&M(Lk) = A(li,k).
Inspired by how a network router finds the subnet of an IP address, as Fig-
ure 4 illustrates, we map a flow to a virtual counter per level based on a single
hash value. Specifically, given an incoming flow f , we compute H(f), and then
do a bitwise AND operation of H(f) and a mask value M(Lk) of the current
level Lk. We then check whether the result is equal to the hash value A(`i,k) of
the currently loaded counter array `i,k (the ith counter array in the kth level).
If the H(f) AND M(Lk) = A(`i,k), then the virtual counter of f in the level Lk
is in the currently loaded counter array `i,k.
Assuming RLFD has d levels and m counters in each counter array, we hash
a flow ID f = fid(x) into H(f) with s · d bits, where s = log2m. We require the
system designer to only choose the base-2 exponential value for m, so that the
s is an integer.
The bits [bs(k−1) : bsk−1] 9 of H(f) are the index of the virtual counter
in its counter array in the kth level Lk. As each counter array is determined
by its ancestor counters as Figure 2(b) describes, the bits [b0 : bs(k−1)−1] can
uniquely determine the counter array in the level Lk for the flow f . Thus, to
check whether the virtual counters of a flow is in memory, we just need to
track the ancestor counters of the currently loaded counter array `i,k. We track
the ancestor counters by A(`i,k), which is also a value of s · d bits. The bits
[a0 : as(k−1)−1] record the index of ancestor counters of `i,k, and the rest of bits
are all 0s. To track A(`i,k), we just simply set the bits [as(k−1) : ask−1] as the
index of the selected counter at the end of the period of Lk. The mask value for
the level Lk is also a value of s ·d bits, whose first s(k−1) bits are 1s and the rest
9 [bi : bj ] denotes a block of bits {bk}, i ≤ k ≤ j.
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are 0s. By H(fid(x)) AND M(Lk), we extract the ancestor bits [b0 : bs(k−1)−1]
of the flow fid(x), and compare it with the ancestor bits [a0 : as(k−1)−1] of the
loaded counter array. If they match, then the flow fid(x)’s counter is in the
memory, and we update the counter with index [bs(k−1) : bsk−1] by the size of
the packets of the flow fid(x).
For each packet, our implementation above only need three basic operations:
a hash operation, an AND operation, and a comparison over d log2m bits. Al-
though the number of bits used in this implementation depends on d and m, a
64-bit long integer is enough in most of the cases, thus those operations only
take O(1) CPU cycles in a modern 64-bit CPU.
4.3 RLFD Details and Optimization
We describe some of the details of RLFD and propose additional optimizations
to the basic RLFD described in Section 4.1.
Hash function update. We update the keyed hash function by choosing a
new key at the beginning of every initial level to guarantee that the assignment of
flows to counters between different top-to-bottom detection cycles is independent
and pseudo-random. For simplicity, in this paper we analyze RLFD assuming
the random oracle model. Picking a new key is computationally inexpensive and
needs to be performed only once per cycle.
Blacklist. When RLFD identifies a large flow, the flow’s ID should be added
to the blacklist as quickly as possible. Thus, we implement the blacklist with
a small amount of L1 cache backed by permanent storage, e.g., main memory.
Because the blacklist write only happens at the bottom-level period and the
number of large flows detected in one iteration of the algorithm is at most one,
we first write these large flows in the L1 cache and move them from L1 cache
to permanent storage at a slower rate. By managing the blacklist in this way,
we provide high bandwidth for blacklist writing, defending against attacks that
overflow the blacklist.
Using multiple RLFDs. If a link handles too much traffic to use a single
RLFD, we can use multiple RLFDs in parallel. Each flow is hashed to a specific
RLFD so that the load on each detector meets performance requirements. The
memory requirements scale linearly in the number of RLFDs required to process
the traffic.
4.4 RLFD Runtime Analysis
We analyze the runtime using the same CPU considered in EARDet [42]. An OC-
768 (40 Gbps) high-speed link can accommodate 40 million mid-size (1000 bit)
packets per second. To operate at the line rate, a modern 3.2 GHz CPU must
process each packet within 76 CPU cycles. A modern CPU might contain 32 KB
L1 cache, 256 KB L2 cache, and 20 MB L3 cache. It takes 4, 12, and 30 CPU
cycles to access L1, L2, and L3 CPU cache, respectively; accessing main memory
is as slow as 300 cycles.
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If, over a 40-Gbps link, we conservatively pick a large-flow threshold rate
γ = 100 kbps, a maximum of 400, 000 flows can be supported. An RLFD with
400, 000 flows and 128 counters per level only needs d = 3 levels to get an
average of 24.4 flows at the bottom level, causing only a few collisions for the
128 counters at the bottom level which will be handled by the Cuckoo hashing
approach. Even if we consider a much larger number of flows, such as 40 million,
d = 4 levels results in around 19.1 flows at the bottom level. In such a 4-level
RLFD, a flow’s path through the tree will require only 4 · log2 128 = 28 bits, so a
64-bit integer is large enough for the hash value. In practice, the threshold rate
is higher than 100 kbps, and the number of flows is likely to be under 40 million.
Computational complexity. Based on the implementation and optimiza-
tions in Sections 4.2 and 4.3, RLFD performs the following steps on each packet:
(1) a hash computation to find the flow’s path in the tree, (2) a bitwise AND
operation to find the subpath down to the depth of the current period, (3) an
integer comparison to determine if the flow is part of an active counter, and (4)
a counter value update if the flow is hashed into the loaded counter array. Each
of these operations is O(1) complexity and fast enough to compute within 76
CPU cycles.
At the bottom level, after operations (1) to (3), RLFD performs the following
steps: (5) a Cuckoo lookup/insert to find the appropriate counter, (6) a counter
value update to represent the usage of a flow, (7) a large-flow check that compares
the counter value with a threshold, and (8) an on-chip blacklist write if the
counter has exceeded the threshold. Steps (5)–(7) are only performed on packets
from the small fraction of flows that are loaded in the bottom-level array; step
(8) is only for packets of the flows identified as large flows in step (7), and this
only happens once for each flow (if we block the large flows in the blacklist).
Thus steps (5)–(8) are executed much less frequently than steps (1)–(4). Even
so, steps (5)–(8) have a constant time in expectation, and are negligible in
comparison with steps (1)–(4).
Storage complexity. RLFD only keeps a small array of counters and a few
additional variables: the hash function key, the 64-bit mask value for the current
level, and the 64-bit identifier of the currently loaded counter array. Because we
use Cuckoo hashing at the bottom level, besides a 32-bit field for the counter
value, each counter entry needs to have a field for the associated flow ID key,
which is 96 bits in IPv4 and 288 bits in IPv6. An array of 128 counters requires
2 KB in IPv4 and 5 KB for IPv6, which readily fits within the L1 cache. As
discussed in Appendix A.2, we can further shrink the flow ID field size to 48 bits
(with FP probability ≤ 2−38 for each flow); if deployed, a 128 counter array is
1.25 KB and a 1024 counter array is 10 KB for both IPv4 and IPv6, which can
fit into the L1 cache (32 KB).
4.5 RLFD’s Advantages and Disadvantages
Advantages. With recursive subdivision and additional optimization tech-
niques, RLFD is able to (1) identify low-rate large flows with non-zero prob-
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ability, with probability close to 100% for flows that cause extensive damage
(Section 5.3 analyzes RLFD’s detection probability); and (2) guarantee no-FP,
eliminating damage due to FP.
Disadvantages. First, a landmark-window-based algorithm such as RLFD
cannot guarantee exact detection over large-flow specification based on arbi-
trary time windows [42] (landmark window and arbitrary window are intro-
duced in Section 2.1). However, this approximation results in limited damage,
as mentioned in Section 3. Second, recursive subdivision based on landmark time
windows requires at least one detection cycle to catch a large flow. Thus, RLFD
cannot guarantee low damage for flows with very high rates. Third, RLFD works
most effectively when the large flow exceeds the flow specification in all d levels,
so bursty flows with a burst duration shorter than the RLFD detection cycle Tc
are likely to escape detection (where burst duration refers to the amount of time
during which the bursty flow sends in excess of the flow specification).
4.6 CLEF Hybrid Scheme
We propose a hybrid scheme, CLEF, which is a parallel composition with one
EARDet and two RLFDs (Twin-RLFD). This hybrid can detect both high-rate
and low-rate large flows without producing FPs, requiring only a limited amount
of memory. We use EARDet instead of Flow Memory in this hybrid scheme
because EARDet’s detection is deterministic, thus has shorter detection delay.
Parallel composition of EARDet and RLFD. As described in Section 3.2,
we combine EARDet and RLFD in parallel so that RLFD can help EARDet
detect low-rate flat flows, and EARDet can help RLFD quickly catch high-rate
flat and bursty flows.
Twin-RLFD parallel composition. RLFD is most effective at catching
flows that violate flow specification across an entire detection cycle Tc. An at-
tacker can reduce the probability of being caught by RLFD by choosing a burst
duration shorter than Tc and an inter-burst duration greater than Tc/d (thus
reducing the probability that the attacker will advance to the next round during
its inter-burst period). We therefore introduce a second RLFD (RLFD(2)) with a
longer detection cycle T
(2)
c , so that a flow must have burst duration shorter than
T
(1)
c and burst period longer than T
(2)
c /d to avoid detection by the Twin-RLFD
(where RLFD(1) and T
(1)
c , are the first RLFD and its detection cycle respec-
tively). For a given average rate, flows that evade Twin-RLFD have a higher
burst rate than flows that evade a single RLFD. By properly setting T
(1)
c and
T
(2)
c , Twin-RLFD can synergize with EARDet, ensuring that a flow undetectable
by Twin-RLFD must use a burst higher than EARDet’s rate threshold γh.
Timing randomization. An attacker can strategically send traffic with burst
durations shorter than T
(1)
c , but choose low duty cycles to avoid detection by
both RLFD(1) and EARDet. Such an attacker can only be detected by RLFD(2),
but RLFD(2) has a longer detection delay, allowing the attacker to maximize
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damage before being blacklisted. To prevent attackers from deterministically
maximizing damage, we randomize the length of the detection cycles T
(1)
c and
T
(2)
c .
5 Theoretical Analysis
Table 2: Table of Notations.
Generic notations:
ρ , Rate of (outbound) link
γ, β , Rate and burst threshold flow specification
θ , Duty cycle of bursty flows (θ ≤ 1)
Tb , Period of burst
Ratk, α , Average large-flow rate, and Ratk = αγ
n , Number of legitimate flows
nγ , ργ ; Maximum number of legitimate flows at
rate γ
m , Number of counters available in a detector
γh , ρm+1 ; EARDet high-rate threshold rate
E(Dover) , Expected overuse damage
RLFD notations:
d , Number of levels
n(k) , Number of legitimate flows in the level k
T` , Time period of a detection level
Tc , Detection cycle Tc = d · T`
Pr(Aα) , Detection prob. for flows with Ratk = αγ
α0.5 ,When α ≥ α0.5, approximately Pr(Aα) ≥
0.5
α1.0 ,When α ≥ α1.0, approximately Pr(Aα) =
1.0
In this section, we discuss RLFD’s performance and its large-flow detection
probability. We then compare CLEF with state-of-the-art schemes, considering
various types of large flows under CLEF’s worst-case background traffic. Due to
limited space, some derivations are in the appendix.
Detection probability. Single-level detection probability is the probability
that a RLFD selects a correct counter (containing at least one large flow) for
the next level. Total detection probability is the probability that one copy of
RLFD catches a large flow in a cycle Tc, which is the product of the single-level
detection probabilities across all levels in a cycle, minus the probability that
two large flows will be assigned to the highest counter at the last level. The
subtrahend is small and negligible when the number of levels is large enough.
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5.1 RLFD Worst-case Background Traffic
Since our goal is to minimize worst-case damage, we assume the worst-case back-
ground traffic against RLFD in the rest of the analysis. Given a large flow, the
worst-case background traffic is the legitimate flow traffic pattern that maximizes
damage caused by a large flow. Since damage increases with expected detection
delay (and thus decreases with single-level detection probability) in RLFD, we
derive the worst-case background traffic by finding the minimum single-level de-
tection probability for each level of RLFD. Theorem 1 states that the worst-case
background traffic consists of threshold-rate legitimate flows fully utilizing the
outbound link. The proof and discussion of Theorem 1 and are presented in
Appendix B.3.
Theorem 1. On a link with a threshold rate γ and an outbound link capacity ρ,
given an attack large flow fatk, RLFD runs with the lowest probability to select
the counter containing fatk to the next level, when there are nγ = ρ/γ legitimate
flows, each of which is at the rate of γ.
Figure 11 in Appendix B.3 presents single-level detection probabilities for
several different background traffic patterns, which empirically validates our the-
orem.
5.2 Characterizing Large Flows
To systematically compare CLEF with other detectors under various types of
attack flows, we categorize large flows based on three characteristics, as Figure 5
illustrates:
1. Burst Period (Tb). A large flow sends a burst of traffic in a period of Tb.
2. Duty Cycle (θ ∈ (0, 1]). In each period of length Tb, a large flow only sends
packets during a continuous time period of θTb and remains silent during
the rest of the period.
3. Average Rate (Ratk). This is the average volume of traffic sent from a large
flow per second over a time interval much longer than the burst period Tb.
The instant rate during the burst chunk θTb is Ratk/θ.
time
…
𝑹𝒂𝒕𝒌𝜽𝑹𝒂𝒕𝒌 𝜽𝑻𝒃 𝑻𝒃
Fig. 5: Flow with average rate Ratk, burst period Tb, duty cycle θ ∈ (0, 1].
16 H. Wu, H-C. Hsiao, D. E. Asoni, S. Scherrer, A. Perrig and Y-C. Hu
By remaining silent between bursts, attacks such as the Shrew attack [22]
keep the average rate lower than the detection threshold to evade the detection
algorithms based on landmark windows [12,13,15,16,19,28–30].
A large flow may switch between different characteristic patterns over time,
including ones that comply with flow specifications. The total damage in this
case can be computed by adding up the damage inflicted by the large flow under
each appearing pattern. Hence, for the purpose of the analysis, we focus our
discussion on large flows with fixed characteristic patterns.
5.3 RLFD Detection Probability for Flat Flows
In order to detect a flat (θ = 1) large flow, the traffic of the flat large flow should
be observable in each detection level.
The probability that RLFD catches one large flow in a detection cycle in-
creases with the number of large flows passing through RLFD. Because a greater
number of large flows implies that more counters may contain large flows in each
level, RLFD has a higher chance of correctly selecting counters with large flows
in the recursive subdivision. We therefore discuss the worst-case scenario for
RLFD where only one large flow is present.
Because the operation in all but the bottom level of RLFD is similar and the
only difference is the flows hashed to the counter array, we discuss the detection
in a single level first and expand it to the whole detection cycle. Additional
numeric examples are provided in Appendix B.4.
Single-level detection probability. Given the total number of flows travers-
ing the link is n, we can predict the expected number of flows in the kth level
by n(k) = n/mk−1, where m is the number of counters. Since n(k) depends only
on the total number of flows and not the traffic distribution, we discuss a single-
level detection with n(k) legitimate flows, m counters, and a large flow at the
rate of Ratk = αγ, where γ is the threshold rate and α > 1. When the context
is clear, we use n to stand for n(k) in the discussion of single-level detection.
According to Theorem 1, the worst-case background traffic is that all n legit-
imate flows are at the threshold rate γ; Theorem 2 shows an approximate lower
bound of the single-level detection probability Pworst(m,n, α) in such worst-case
background traffic. The proof of Theorem 2 and its Corollaries 1 and 2 are
presented in Appendix C.1.
Theorem 2. Given m counters in a level, n legitimate flows at full rate γ, and a
large flow fatk with an average rate of Ratk = αγ, the probability Pworst(m,n, α)
that RLFD will correctly select the counter with large flow fatk has an approxi-
mate lower bound of 1−Q(K, nm ), where K =
⌊
n
m +
√
2 nm log n−α
⌋
; Q(K, nm ) is
the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of the Poisson distribution Pois( nm ).
Corollary 1. For a detection level with n legitimate flows, m counters, and a
large flow fatk at the average rate of α0.5 ·γ, the probability Pworst(m,n, α0.5) that
RLFD will correctly select the counter of fatk has an approximate lower bound
of 0.5, where α0.5 =
√
2 nm log n.
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Corollary 2. For a detection level with n legitimate flows, m counters, and a
large flow fatk at the average rate of α1.0 ·γ, the probability Pworst(m,n, α1.0) that
RLFD will correctly select the counter of fatk has an approximate lower bound
of 1.0, where α1.0 = 2 · α0.5 = 2
√
2 nm log n.
Total detection probability. Theorem 3 describes the total probability of
detecting a large flow in one detection cycle. Detailed proof is provided in Ap-
pendix C.2.
Theorem 3. When there are n legitimate flows and a flat large flow at the
rate of αγ, the total detection probability of a RLFD with m counters has an
approximate lower bound:
Pr(Aα) ≥

(
1−Q(Kγ , nγ
m
)
)blogm(n/nγ)c+1
, when n ≥ nγ
1−Q(K, n
m
) , when n < nγ
(1)
where Kγ =
⌊nγ
m +
√
2
nγ
m log nγ −α
⌋
, K =
⌊
n
m +
√
2 nm log n−α
⌋
, and Q(x, λ)
is the CDF of the Poisson distribution Pois(λ).
5.4 Twin-RLFD Theoretical Overuse Damage
To evaluate RLFD’s performance, we derive a theoretical bound on the damage
caused by large flows against RLFD. Recall that there are two sources of damage:
FP damage Dfp and overuse damage Dover. Because RLFD has no FP, there is
no need to consider Dfp. Thus, we only theoretically analyze Dover.
Theorem 4 shows the expected overuse damage for flat flows and bursty
flows against a Twin-RLFD. The proof is presented in Appendix C.3. Additional
numeric examples are in Appendix B.5.
Theorem 4. A Twin-RLFD with RLFD(1) and RLFD(2) whose detection cy-
cles are T
(1)
c and T
(2)
c =
2dγh
αγ T
(1)
c , respectively, it can detect bursty flows at an
average rate Ratk = αγ < θγh, where γh is the high-rate threshold rate of the
EARDet. The expected overuse damage caused by such flows has the following
upper bound:
E(Dover) ≤
{
T (1)c γα/θPr(Aα) , when θTb ≥ 2T (1)c
T (1)c 2dγh/θPr(Aα) , when θTb < 2T
(1)
c
(2)
where
Pr(Aα) ≥

(
1−Q(Kγ , nγ
m
)
)blogm(n/nγ)c+1
, when n ≥ nγ
1−Q(K, n
m
) , when n < nγ
(3)
and Kγ =
⌊nγ
m +
√
2
nγ
m log nγ − αθ
⌋
, K =
⌊
n
m +
√
2 nm log n − αθ
⌋
(αθ = α/θ
when θTb ≥ 2T (1)c , and αθ = α when θTb < 2T (1)c ). The d is the number of
levels in RLFD, and Q(x, λ) is the CDF of the Poisson distribution Pois(λ).
The damage of flat flow is that in the case of θ = 1 and θTb ≥ 2T (1)c .
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We can see that a properly configured Twin-RLFD can detect bursty flows
unable to be detected by EARDet (i.e., flows at average rate Ratk = αγ < θγh).
Table 3: Theoretical Comparison. CLEF outperforms other detectors with lower
large flow damage. Damage in megabyte (MB).
Algorithm
FP
Overuse Damage (MB)
Damage Low-rate Large Flow High-rate Large Flow
Ratk < 10γ
10γ < Ratk < 30γ 30γ ≤ Ratk < 250γ 250γ ≤ Ratk
θTb < 2Tc θTb ≥ 2Tc θTb < 2Tc θTb ≥ 2Tc θTb < 2Tc θTb ≥ 2Tc
Individual
Twin-RLFD 0 [512,+∞) [158, 512) [33, 45) [70, 158) [6, 33) [99,+∞) [6,+∞)
EARDet 0 +∞ +∞ +∞ +∞ +∞ ≈ 0 ≈ 0
FM 0 +∞∗ +∞∗ +∞∗ +∞∗ +∞∗ ≈ 0 ≈ 0
AMF +∞ ≈ 0 ≈ 0 ≈ 0 ≈ 0 ≈ 0 ≈ 0 ≈ 0
Hybrid
CLEF 0 [512,+∞) [158, 512) [33, 45) [70, 158) [6, 33) ≈ 0 ≈ 0
AMF-FM 0 +∞∗ +∞∗ +∞∗ +∞∗ +∞∗ ≈ 0 ≈ 0
Comparison in a 40 Gbps link with threshold rate γ = 400 Kbps. Each of
Twin-RLFD, EARDet, FM and AMF has m = 100 counters (each of single RLFD
has 50 counters), and thus each of CLEF and AMF-FM has 200 counters. In
Twin-RLFD and CLEF, detection cycles T
(1)
c = Tc = 0.1 sec, T
(2)
c = 7.92 sec, and
number of levels is d = 4. Attack Flows are busty flows with duty cycle of θ = 0.25.
The reasons for this Twin-RLFD configuration are shown in Appendix B.5.
∗The overuse damage for FM is treated as infinity, due to the extremely low detection
probability.
5.5 Theoretical Comparison
We compare the CLEF hybrid scheme with the most relevant competitor, the
AMF-FM hybrid scheme [15], which runs an AMF and a FM sequentially: all
traffic is first sent to the AMF and the AMF sends detected large flows (including
FPs) to the FM to eliminate FPs. For completeness, we also present the results of
individual detectors, including Twin-RLFD, EARDet, AMF, and Flow Memory
(FM). Table 3 summarizes the damage inflicted by different large-flow patterns
when different detectors are deployed. The damage is calculated according to
the analyses of AMF (Appendix B.2), FM (Appendix B.1), EARDet [42], and
Twin-RLFD (Section 5.4). Figures 13(c) and 13(e) in Appendix B.5 provide
more details about Twin-RLFD’s overuse damage presented in Table 3.
Comparison setting. To compare detectors in an in-core router setting, we
allocate only 100 counters for each detector, and we allocate 50 counters for each
RLFD in the Twin-RLFD for a fair comparison. Each hybrid scheme has 200
counters in total to ensure fair comparison between hybrid schemes is fair.
We consider both high-rate large flows (Ratk ≥ 250γ) and low-rate large flows
(Ratk < 250γ). 250γ is the minimum rate at which detection is guaranteed by
EARDet, FM, and AMF-FM: θρm =
0.25×105γ
100 . Low-rate large flows are further
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divided into three rate intervals for thorough comparison. For each rate interval,
we consider the worst-case (θTb < 2Tc) and non-worst-case (θTb ≥ 2Tc) burst
length. The duty cycle of the bursty flow is set to θ = 0.25, which is challenging
for CLEF. Given an average rate Ratk, if θ is close to 0 (close to 1), a bursty
flow is easily detected by EARDet (Twin-RLFD) in CLEF.
CLEF ensures lower damage. As shown in Table 3, Twin-RLFD and CLEF
outperform other detectors for identifying a wide range of low-rate flows. How-
ever, due to limited memory, it remains challenging for Twin-RLFD and CLEF
to effectively detect large flows that are extremely close to the threshold.
We can see that Twin-RLFD fails to limit the damage caused by high-rate
large flows, because the overuse damage is linear in Ratk of high-rate flows (due
to the minimum detection delay of one cycle). Thus, CLEF uses EARDet to
limit the damage caused by high-rate flows. CLEF is better than the AMF-FM
hybrid scheme. This is because the FP from AMF (with limited memory) is too
high to narrow down the traffic passed to the FM in the downstream, so that
the FM’s performance is not improved.
Number of Counters (m)
0 50 100
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R
m
in
/γ
×104
0
0.5
1
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γ
=105
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(a) When ρ = 105γ
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Fig. 6: Minimum Rate of Guaranteed Detection Rmin (shown as Rmin/γ in fig-
ures), for flat large flows (θ = 1.0), when link capacity ρ = 105γ and 107γ, where
γ is threshold rate. Twin-RLFD and CLEF have much lower rate of guaranteed
detection than other schemes when the memory is limited.
CLEF is memory-efficient. We now consider the minimum rate of guaran-
teed detection (Rmin) for flat flows (i.e., flat large flows (θ = 1.0) exceeding the
rate Rmin) of these detectors. The Rmin of Twin-RLFD and CLEF is bounded
from above by 4θ
√
m lognγ
nγ
ρ
m (derived from Corollary 2), which is much less than
the Rmin = θ
ρ
m+1 for EARDet and Rmin = θ
ρ
m for FM and AMF-FM. This is
especially true when the memory is extremely limited (i.e. nγ  m), where nγ
is the maximum number of legitimate flows at the threshold rate γ, and m is
the number of counters for each individual detector (each RLFD in Twin-RLFD
has m/2 counters).
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Figures 6(a) and 6(b) compare the Rmin amongst these three detectors given
two link capacities: 1) ρ = 105γ (i.e., nγ = 10
5), and 2) ρ = 107γ (i.e., nγ = 10
7).
The results suggest that Twin-RLFD and CLEF have a much lower Rmin than
that of other detectors when memory is limited, and the Rmin is insensitive to
memory size because RLFD can add levels to overcome memory shortage.
For bursty flows, CLEF’s Rmin is competitive to AMF-FM, due to EARDet.
6 Evaluation
We experimentally evaluate CLEF, RLFD, EARDet, and AMF-FM with respect
to worst-case damage [41, Sec. 5.1]. We consider various large-flow patterns and
memory limits and assume background traffic that is challenging for CLEF and
RLFD. The experiment results confirm that CLEF outperforms other schemes,
especially when memory is extremely limited.
6.1 Experiment Settings
Link settings. Since the required memory space of a large-flow detector is
sublinear to link capacity, we set the link capacity to ρ = 1Gbps, which is high
enough to incorporate the realistic background traffic dataset while ensuring the
simulation can finish in reasonable time. We choose a very low threshold rate
γ = 12.5 KB/s, so that the number of full-use legitimate flows nγ = ρ/γ is
10000, ensuring that the link is as challenging as a backbone link (as analyzed
in Section 4.4 ). The flow specification is set to TH(t) = γt + β, where β is set
to 3028 bytes (which is as small as two maximum-sized packets, making bursty
flows easier to catch).
The results on this 1Gbps link allow us to extrapolate detector performance
to high-capacity core routers, e.g., in a 100Gbps link with γ = 1.25 MB/s. Be-
cause CLEF’s performance with a given number of counters is mainly related
to the ratio between link capacity and threshold rate nγ (as discussed in Sec-
tion 5.3), CLEF’s worst-case performance will scale linearly in link capacity when
the number of counters and the ratio between link capacity and threshold rate
is held constant. AMF-FM, on the other hand, performs worse as the number
of flows increases (according to Appendix B.2 and B.1). Thus, with increasing
link capacity, AMF-FM may face an increased number of actual flows, resulting
in worse performance. In other words, AMF-FM’s worst-case damage may be
superlinear in link capacity. As a result, if CLEF outperforms AMF-FM in small
links, CLEF will outperform AMF-FM by at least as large a ratio in larger links.
Background traffic. We consider the worst background traffic for RLFD
and CLEF: we determine the worst-case traffic according to Theorem 1. Aside
from attack traffic, the rest of the link capacity is completely filled with full-use
legitimate flows running at the threshold rate γ = 12.5 KB/s. The total number
of attack flows and full-use legitimate flows is nγ = 10000. Once a flow has
been blacklisted by the large-flow detectors, we fill the idle bandwidth with a
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new full-use legitimate flow, to keep the link always running with the worst-case
background traffic.
Attack traffic. We evaluate each detector against large flows with various
average rates Ratk and duty cycle θ. Their bursty period is set to be Tb = 0.967s.
To evaluate RLFD and CLEF against their worst-case bursty flows (θTb < 2Tc),
large flows are allotted a relatively small bursty period Tb = 4T` = 0.967s, where
T` = β/γ = 0.242s is the period of each detection level in the single RLFD. In
CLEF, RLFD(1) uses the same detection level period T
(1)
` = T` = 0.242s as well.
Since RLFD usually has d ≥ 3 levels and Tc ≥ 3T`, it is easy for attack flows to
meet θTb < 2Tc.
In each experiment, we have 10 artificial large flows whose rates are in the
range of 12.5 KB/s to 12.5 MB/s (namely, 1 to 1000 times that of threshold rate
γ). The fewer large flows in the link, the longer delay required for RLFD and
CLEF to catch large flows; however, the easier it is for AMF-FM to detect large
flows, because there are fewer FPs from AMF and more frequent flow eviction
in FM. Thus, we use 10 attack flows to challenge CLEF and the results are
generalizable.
Detector settings We evaluate detectors with different numbers of counters
(20 ≤ m ≤ 400) to understand their performance under different memory limits.
Although a few thousands of counters are available in a typical CPU, not all can
be used by one detector scheme. CLEF works reasonably well with such a small
number of counters and can perform better when more counters are available.
– EARDet . We set the low-bandwidth threshold to be the flow specification
γt + β, and compute the corresponding high-rate threshold, γh =
ρ
m+1 , for
m counters as in [42].
– RLFD . A RLFD has d levels and m counters. We set the period of a detec-
tion level as T` = β/γ = 0.242 seconds
10. d = b1.2 × logm(n)c + 1 to have
fewer flows than the counters at the bottom level. The counter threshold of
the bottom level is THRLFD = γT` + β = 2β = 6056 Bytes.
– CLEF . We allocate m/2 counters to EARDet, and m/4 counters to each
RLFD. RLFD(1) and EARDet are configured like the single RLFD and the
single EARDet above. For the RLFD(2), we properly set its detection level
period T
(2)
` to guarantee detection of most of bursty flows with low damage.
The details of the single RLFD and CLEF are in Table 4 (Appendix D).
– AMF-FM . We allocate half of the m counters to AMF and the rest to
FM. AMF has four stages (a typical setting in [15]), each of which contains
m/8 counters. All m counters are leaky buckets with a drain rate of γ and
a bucket size β.
10 If T`  β/γ, it is hard for a large flow to reach the burst threshold β in such a short
time; if T`  β/γ, the detection delay is too long, resulting in excessive damage.
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(a) Flat large flows, θ = 1.0
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(b) Bursty large flows, θ = 0.50
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(c) Bursty large flows, θ = 0.25
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(d) Bursty large flow, θ = 0.10
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(e) Bursty large flows, θ = 0.02
Fig. 7: Damage (in Bytes) caused by 200-second large flows at different average
flow rate Ratk (in Byte/s) and duty cycle θ under detection of different schemes
with different number of counters m. The larger the dark area, the lower the
damage guaranteed by a scheme. Areas with white color are damage equals or
exceeds 5 × 108. CLEF outperforms other schemes in detecting flat flows, and
has competitive performance to AMF-FM and EARDet over bursty flows.
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(a) Flat, θ = 1.0
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(d) Bursty, θ = 0.10
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Fig. 8: Damage (in Bytes) caused by 200-second large flows at different average
rate Ratk (in Byte/s) and duty cycle θ. Each detection scheme uses 200 counters
in total. The clear comparison among schemes suggests CLEF outperforms others
with low damage against various large flows.
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Fig. 9: FN ratio in a 200-second detection for large flows at different average rate
Ratk (in Byte/s) and duty cycle θ. Each detection scheme uses 200 counters in
total. CLEF is able to detect (FN< 1.0) low-rate flows undetectable (FN= 1.0)
by AMF-FM or EARDet.
6.2 Experiment Results
For each experiment setting (i.e., attack flow configurations and detector set-
tings), we did 50 repeated runs and present the averaged results.
Figure 7(a) to 7(e) demonstrate the damage caused by large flows at different
average rates, duty cycles, and number of detector counters during 200-second
experiments; the lighter the color, the higher the damage. The damage ≥ 5 ×
108 Byte is represented by the color white. Figures 8(a) to 8(e) compare damage
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in cases of different detectors with 200 counters. Figures 9(a) to 9(e) show the
percentage of FNs produced by each detection scheme with 200 counters within
200 seconds. We cannot run infinitely-long experiments to show the +∞ damage
produced by detectors like EARDet and AMF-FM over low-rate flows, so we use
the FN ratio to suggest it here. An FN of 1.0 means that the detector fails to
identify any large flow in 200 seconds and is likely to miss large flows in the
future. Thus, an infinite damage is assigned. On the contrary, if a detector has
FN rate < 1.0, it is able to detect remaining large flows at some point in the
future.
CLEF ensures low damage against flat flows. Figures 7(a), 8(a), and 9(a)
support our theoretical analysis (in Section 5) that RLFD and CLEF work ef-
fectively at detecting low-rate flat large flows and guaranteeing low damage. On
the contrary, such flows cause much higher damage against EARDet and AMF-
FM. The nearly-black figure (in Figure 7(a)) for CLEF shows that CLEF is
effective for both high-rate and low-rate flat flows with different memory limits.
Figure 8(a) shows a clear damage comparison among detector schemes. CLEF,
EARDet, and AMF-FM all limit the damage to nearly zero for high-rate flat
flows. However, the damage limited by CLEF is much lower than that limited
by AMF-FM and EARDet for the low-rate flat flows. EARDet and AMF-FM
results show a sharp top boundary that reflects the damage dropping to zero at
the guaranteed-detection rates.
The damage limited by an individual RLFD is proportional to the large-
flow rate when the flow rate is high. Figure 9(a) suggests that AMF-FM and
EARDet are unable to catch most low-rate flat flows (Ratk < 10
6 Byte/sec),
which explains the high damage by low-rate flat flows against these two schemes.
This supports our theoretical analysis of AMF-FM and EARDet in Table 3: the
infinite damage by low-rate flows against AMF-FM and EARDet.
CLEF ensures low damage against various bursty flows. Figures 8(b)
to 8(e) demonstrate the damage caused by bursty flows with different duty cycle
θ. The smaller the θ is, the burstier the flow. As the large flows become burstier,
the EARDet and AMF-FM schemes improve at detecting flows whose average
rate is low. Because the rate at the burst is Ratk/θ, which increases as θ decreases,
thus EARDet and AMF-FM are able to detect these flows even though their
average rates are low. For a single RLFD, the burstier the flows are, the harder
it becomes to detect the large flows and limit the damage. As we discussed in
Section 4.6, when the burst duration θTb of flows is smaller than the RLFD
detection cycle Tc, a single RLFD has nearly zero probability of detecting such
attack flows. Thus, we need Twin-RLFD in CLEF to detect bursty flows missed
by EARDet in CLEF, so that CLEF’s damage is still low as the figures show.
When the flow is very bursty (e.g., θ ≤ 0.1), the damage limitation of the CLEF
scheme is dominated by EARDet.
Figures 8(b) to 8(e) present a clear comparison among different schemes
against bursty flows. The damage limited by CLEF is lower than that limited by
AMF-FM and EARDet, when θ is not too small (e.g., θ ≥ 0.25). Even though
AMF-FM and EARDet have lower damage for very bursty flows (e.g., θ ≤ 0.1)
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than the damage limited by CLEF, the results are close because CLEF is assisted
by an EARDet with m/2 counters. Thus, CLEF guarantees a low damage limit
for a wider range of large flows than the other schemes.
CLEF outperforms others in terms of FN and FP. To make our com-
parison more convincing, we examine schemes with classic metrics: FN and FP.
Since we know all four schemes have no FP, we simply check the FN ratios in
Figures 9(a) to 9(e). Generally, CLEF has a lower FN ratio than AMF-FM and
EARDet do. CLEF can detect large flows at a much lower rate with zero FN
ratio, and is competitive to AMF-FM and EARDet against very bursty flows
(e.g., Figures 9(b) and 9(e)).
CLEF is memory-efficient. Figure 7(a) shows that the damage limited by
RLFD is relatively insensitive to the number of counters. This suggests that
RLFD can work with limited memory and is scalable to larger links without re-
quiring a large amount of high-speed memory. This can be explained by RLFD’s
recursive subdivision, by which we simply add one or more levels when the mem-
ory limit is low. Thus, we choose RLFD to complement EARDet in CLEF.
In Figure 7(a), CLEF ensures a low damage (shown in black) with tens of
counters, while AMF-FM suffers from a high damage (shown in light colors),
even with 400 counters. This supports our theoretical results in Figures 6(a)
and 6(b).
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Fig. 10: Damage and FN ratio for large flows at different average rate Ratk (in
Byte/s) and duty cycle θ under detection of CLEF with m = 200 counters. CLEF
is insensitive to bursty flows across duty cycles: 1) the damages are around the
same scale (not keep increasing as duty cycle decrease, because of EARDet), 2)
the FN ratios are stable and similar.
CLEF is effective against various types of bursty flows. Figures 10(a)
and 10(b) demonstrate the changes of damage and FN ratio versus different duty
cycles θ when CLEF is used to detect bursty flows. In the 200-second evaluation,
as θ decreases, the maximum damage across different average flow rates increases
first by (θ ≥ 0.1) and then decreases by (θ < 0.1). The damage increases when
θ ≥ 0.1 because Twin-RLFD (in CLEF) gradually loses its capability to detect
bursty flows. The damage therefore increases due to the increase in detection
delay.
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However, the maximum damage does not increase all the way as θ decreases,
because when θ is getting smaller, EARDet is able to catch bursty flows with a
lower average rate. This explains the lower damage from large flows in the 200-
second timeframe. Figure 10(b) shows that the FN ratio curve changes within
a small range as θ decreases, which also indicates the stable performance of
CLEF against various bursty flows. Moreover, the FN ratios are all below 1.0,
which means that CLEF can eventually catch large flows, whereas EARDet and
AMF-FM cannot.
CLEF operates at high speed. We also evaluated the performance of a
Golang-based implementation under real-world traffic trace from the CAIDA [7]
dataset. The implementation is able to process 11.8M packets per second, which
is sufficient for a 10 Gbps Ethernet link, which has a capacity of 14.4M packets
per second.
7 Related Work
The most closely related large-flow detection algorithms are described in Sec-
tion 3.1 and compared in Sections 5 and 6. This section discusses other related
schemes.
Frequent-item finding. Algorithms that find frequent items in a stream can
be applied to large-flow detection. For example, Lossy Counting [28] maintains
a lower bound and an upper bound of each item’s count. It saves memory by
periodically removing items with an upper bound below a threshold, but loses
the ability to catch items close to the threshold. However, the theoretical memory
lower bound of one-pass exact detection is linear to the number of large flows,
which is unaffordable by in-core routers. By combining a frequent-item finding
scheme with RLFD, CLEF can rapidly detect high-rate large flows and confine
low-rate large flows using limited memory.
Collision-rich schemes. To reduce memory requirement in large-flow uti-
lization, a common technique is hashing flows into a small number of bins. How-
ever, hash collisions may cause FPs, and FPs increase as the available memory
shrinks. For example, both multistage filters [14, 15] and space-code Bloom fil-
ters [21] suffer from high FPs when memory is limited.
Sampling-based schemes. Sampling-based schemes estimate the size of a
flow based on sampled packets. However, with extremely limited memory and
thus a low sampling rate, neither packet sampling (e.g., Sampled Netflow [11])
nor flow sampling (e.g., Sample and Hold [15] and Sticky Sampling [28]) can
robustly identify large flows due to insufficient information. In contrast, RLFD
in CLEF progressively narrows down the candidate set of large flows, thereby
effectively confining the damage caused by large flows.
Top-k detection. Top-k heavy hitter algorithms can be used to identify flows
that use more than 1/k of bandwidth. Space Saving [29] finds the top-k frequent
items by evicting the item with the lowest counter value. HashPipe [36] im-
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proves upon Space Saving so that it can be practically implemented on switch-
ing hardware. However, HashPipe still requires keeping 80KB to detect large
flows that use more than 0.3% of link capacity, whereas CLEF can enforce flow
specifications as low as 10−6 of the link capacity using only 10KB of memory.
Tong et al. [37] propose an efficient heavy hitter detector implemented on FPGA
but the enforceable flow specifications are several orders looser than CLEF.
Moreover, misbehaving flows close to the flow specification can easily bypass
such heavy hitter detectors. The FPs caused by heavy hitters prevent network
operators from applying strong punishment to the detected flows.
Chen et al. [9] and Xiao et al. [43] propose memory-efficient algorithms for
estimating per-flow cardinality (e.g., the number of packets). These algorithms,
however, cannot guarantee large-flow detection in adversarial environments due
to under- or over-estimation of the flow size.
Liu et al. [26] propose a generic network monitoring framework called UniMon
that allows extraction of various flow statistics. It creates flow statistics for all
flows, but has high FP and FN when used to detect large flows.
8 Conclusion
In this paper we propose new efficient large-flow detection algorithms. First, we
develop a randomized Recursive Large-Flow Detection (RLFD) scheme, which
uses very little memory yet provides eventual detection of persistently large
flows. Second, we develop CLEF, which scales to Internet core routers and is
resilient against worst-case traffic. None of the prior approaches can achieve the
same level of resilience with the same memory limitations. To compare attack
resilience among various detectors, we define a damage metric that summarizes
the impact of attack traffic on legitimate traffic. CLEF can confine damage even
when faced with the worst-case background traffic because it combines a deter-
ministic EARDet for the rapid detection of very large flows and two RLFDs to
detect near-threshold large flows. We proved that CLEF is able to guarantee low-
damage large-flow detection against various attack flows with limited memory,
outperforming other schemes even with CLEF’s worst-case background traffic.
Further experimental evaluation confirms the findings of our theoretical analysis
and shows that CLEF has the lowest worst-case damage among all detectors and
consistently low damage over a wide range of attack flows.
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A Additional Details For RLFD Data Structure and
Optimization
A.1 Analysis for No-FP Guarantee
To guarantee no FP, we only identify large flows whose counter has no second
flow, i.e. no flow hash collision Cfree. If we randomly hash flows into counters
at the bottom level Ld, the no-collision probability for a counter is Pr(Cfree) =
[m−1m ]
nd−1, where nd is the number of flows selected into Ld. Because we want
to have d as small as possible, thus, we usually may choose d = dlogm ne, where
n is the total number of flows in the link. Thus, nd ≤ m on average. Thus,
Pr(Cfree) =
[
m− 1
m
]mnd−1
m
≈ e−
nd−1
m (4)
When nd ≈ m, the no-collision probability Pr(Cfree) ≈ 1e = 0.368, which gives
a collision probability for each flow of 0.632.
To avoid the high collision probability in the regular hash above, we ran-
domly pick m flows (out of nd flows) instead. Each of m flows is monitored by a
dedicated counter (which does not introduce additional FNs, because nd ≤ m).
To efficiently implement this counter assignment, we can use Cuckoo hashing [33]
to achieve constant expected flow insertion time and worst-case constant lookup
and update time. Cuckoo hashing resolves collisions by using two hash func-
tions instead of only one in regular hashing. As in [31], Mitzenmacher shows
that, with three hash functions, Cuckoo hashing can achieve expected constant
insertion and lookup time with load factor of 91%. Thus, when m = nd, the
Cuckoo hashing can achieve Pr(Cfree) ≈ 0.91, which is still much larger than
Pr(Cfree) ≈ 0.368 in the regular hashing. As nd is usually less than m (because
we set d to be the ceiling of logm n), it is reasonable to treat the Pr(Cfree) ≈ 1
in our later analysis. Cuckoo hashing requires to store both the key (48 bits for
IPv4, 144 bits for IPv6) and value (32 bits) of an entry, thus, for each counter,
we need space for the flow ID and the counter value.
A.2 Shrinking Counter Entry Size
As we discussed, the number of flows hashed into the bottom level is much less
than m (e.g. at most 210). a key space of 96 bits (288 for IPv6) is too large for
less than 210 keys. We can hash the flow IDs into a smaller key space, e.g. 48
bits to save memory size. For each flow, although hash collision could happen
and may result in FP in the detection in the bottom level, the probability is less
than 1− [ 248−1248 ]2
10−1 ≈ 2−38 which is very small. For systems can tolerate such
extremely low FP probability, we recommend it to do so.
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B Additional Analysis
B.1 Flow Memory Analysis
We analyze the Flow Memory (FM) with random flow eviction mechanism, which
is applied with multistage filters in [15]. For each incoming packet whose flow
is not tracked, such FM randomly picks a flow from the tracked flows and the
new flow to evict. Thus, for each packet of the flow not tracked, the existing
tracked flow has a probability Pe =
1
m+1 to be evicted, where m is the number
of counters in the FM.
Theorem 5. In a link with total traffic rate of R (≤ ρ), the packet size of Spkt,
and the large-flow threshold TH(t) = γt+ β, a Flow Memory with m counters is
able to detect large flows at rate around or higher than βSpkt
R
m with high proba-
bility.
Proof sketch: We assume number of packets arriving at the FM per second
is at the packet rate of Rpkt, thus the time gap between two incoming packets is
Tpkt =
1
Rpkt
=
Spkt
R . For a newly tracked flow f at time stamp 0, the kth eviction
happens at k · Tpkt, and Pe = 1m+1 is the probability that flow f is evicted at
the kth eviction. Evictions are not triggered by packets of flows being tracked,
however the number of flows untracked is far larger than the number of flows
being tracked, thus we can approximate treat the time gap between evictions as
Tpkt. Thus, the expected time length for the flow f to be tracked is
E(Ttrack)
=
+∞∑
k=1
Pe(1− Pe)k−1kTpkt
= lim
k→+∞
(1− Pe)
(
1− (1− Pe)k
Pe
− (k + 1)(1− Pe)k
)
Tpkt
=
1− Pe
Pe
Tpkt = m · Tpkt
(5)
As the FM uses leaky bucket counters to enforce the large-flow threshold
TH
t = γt+β (defined in Section 2.1), the counter threshold is the burst threshold
β. Thus, to detect a large flow at traffic rate of Ratk, the FM requires the large
flow being tracked at least for a time of β/Ratk, otherwise the counter value
cannot reach the threshold. Therefore,
Ratk >
β
E(Ttrack)
=
β
m · Tpkt
=
β
Spkt
R
m
(6)
Thus for the large flows at rates far smaller than the βSpkt
ρ
m are likely to be
evicted before violating the threshold β.
In the practice, the packet size is not fixed, but we treat it with fixed size for
analyzing the least Ratk changes along with the m. Because the real packet size
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is also limited in 1514 Bytes, the βSpkt
is a bounded factor. As the β is usually
larger than the maximum packet size, the βSpkt
> 1 for sure.
We can see the scale of the large flow rate can be detected by FM is similar to
that can be detected by EARDet (i.e., ρm+1 , where ρ is the link capacity). They
both increase as 1m increases. In the worst case of the FM, when the traffic rate
is at link capacity (R = ρ), the least detectable average rates Ratk of the FM
and the EARDet are at the same scale. One difference between them is that the
EARDet can guarantee deterministic detection, while the Flow Memory detects
flows probabilistically. Our simulations in Section 6 support the analysis above.
B.2 Multistage Filter Analysis
According to the theoretical analysis in [15], a m-counter multistage filter with
d stages each of which has m/d counters, the probability for a flow hashed into
a counter in each stage without collision (Cfree) to other flows is as follows. We
let m′ = m/d, and assume there are n flows in total, then
Pr(Cfree) = 1− (1− (1− 1m′ )
n−1)d
= 1− (1− (1− 1
m′
)m
′ n−1
m′ )d
≈ 1− (1− e−n−1m′ )d
→ 0, when n→ +∞
(7)
where we assume the m′  1 and n/m′  1. The assumptions are reasonable:
1) the number of counters m is usually around hundreds, and the d is typically
chosen as 4 in [15], therefore m′  1; 2) we aim to use very limited counters to
detect large flows from a large number of legitimate flows, thus n/m′  1.
In the case that every legitimate flow is higher than the half of the threshold
rate γ/2, the false positive rate is almost 100%, because the Pr(Cfree) is close
to 100%. Any collision in a counter results in that the counter value violates the
counter threshold and thus a falsely positive on legitimate flows.
B.3 RLFD Worst-case Background Traffic
General case: weighted balls-into-bins problem. In the well-known balls-
into-bins problem, we have m bins and n balls. For each ball, we randomly throw
it into one of m bins.
We treat the flows in the network as the balls, and the counter array as the
bins. Hashing flows into counters is just like randomly throwing balls into bins,
where each flow is a weighted ball with weight of its traffic volume sent during
a period T` of each level Lk (1 ≤ k ≤ d).
Worst case: single-weight balls-into-bins problem We assume the rate
threshold γ of our flow specification, TH(t) = γt+β, is γ = ρN , where the ρ is the
outbound link capacity. In the general case, the legitimate flows are at average
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rates less than or equal to the threshold rate γ, however we show that the worst
case background traffic for RLFD to detecting a large flow is that all legitimate
flows are sending traffic at the rate of the threshold rate γ (Theorem 1). As the
inbound link capacity can be larger than the outbound one, there still could
be attack flows in this case. We prove the Theorem 1 by the Theorem 6 from
Berenbrink et al. [5] which is for weighted balls-into-bins games.
Theorem 6. Berenbrink et al.’s Theorem 3.1 For two weighted balls-into-
bins games B(w, n,m) and B′(w′, n,m) of n balls and m bins, the vectors w =
(w1, ..., wn) and w
′ = (w′1, ..., w
′
n) represent the weight of each ball in two B and
B′, respectively. If W =
∑n
i=1 wi =
∑n
i=1 w
′
i and
∑k
i=1 wi ≥
∑k
i=1 w
′
i for all
1 ≤ k ≤ n, then E[Si(w)] ≥ E[Si(w′)] for all 1 ≤ i ≤ m, where the Si(w) is the
total load of the i highest bins, and the E(Si(w)) is the expected Si(w) across all
mn possible balls-into-bins combinations.
Lemma 1 and Proof sketch
Lemma 1. The RLFD has the lowest probability to correctly select the counter
of a large flow fatk to the next level, when the legitimate flows use up all legitimate
bandwidth.
We assume C1 and C2 are two different counter states after adding the attack
traffic and the traffic of some legitimate flows, and there are V more volume of
traffic allowed to send by the other legitimate flows before the total volume of
legitimate flows reaches the outbound link capacity. Let Vatk be the value of the
counter assigned to fatk, and the Vmax be the maximum value of other counters.
In the C1, we let Vatk > Vmax + V ; in the C2, we let Vatk ≤ Vmax + V . Hence,
C1 and C2 cover all possible counter states. As there are still up to V volume of
legitimate flows can be added into counters. We use V ′atk and V
′
max to represent
the final value of Vatk and Vmax. Thus, the probability to select the counter of
fatk is
Pr(V ′atk > V
′
max) = Pr(V
′
atk > V
′
max|C1)Pr(C1) + Pr(V ′atk > V ′max|C2)Pr(C2) (8)
Because Vatk > Vmax + V in C1, and the V ′max cannot exceed Vmax + V , thus
always V ′atk > V
′
max. Then,
Pr(V ′atk > V
′
max) = Pr(C1) + Pr(V ′atk > V ′max|C2)Pr(C2) (9)
Let x be the amount of legitimate traffic added into counters after C2, where
0 ≤ x ≤ V . If the x = V , then there is a chance to have all V added on the Vmax,
and thus V ′max = Vmax + V = Vatk = V
′
atk, so that Pr(V
′
atk > V
′
max|C2) is lower
than that when x < V . Therefore, Pr(V ′atk > V
′
max) is lower in the case that
legitimate flows fully use the link capacity than other cases. Thus, the Lemma 1
is proved. 
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Proof sketch of Theorem 1 We first just consider the legitimate traffic but
not the attack flow. As Lemma 1 illustrated, the more traffic sent from legitimate
flows, the harder for RLFD to correctly select the counter with the attack flow
fatk, thus to have the worst RLFD detection probability, legitimate flow should
use all outbound link capacity, and it requires the flow number n ≥ ρ/γ.
Given n ≥ ρ/γ and m, we first construct a legitimate flow configuration
B(w, n,m), wi = γ for 1 ≤ i ≤ ρ/γ and wi = 0 for i > ρ/γ which is
the worst-case legitimate configuration we want to prove, because there are
actually only the first ρ/γ flows with non-zero rate. For any legitimate flow
configuration B′(w′, n,m) with constraint of
∑k
i=1 w
′
i = ρ. It is easy to find∑k
i=1 wi ≥
∑k
i=1 w
′
i.
Thus, according to Theorem 6 [5] the E[Si(w)] ≥ E[Si(w′)] for all 1 ≤ i ≤ m,
where E[Si(w)] is the expected total counter value of the i highest counters in
the case of B(w, n,m) and E[Si(w
′)] is the one in the case of any other legitimate
flow configuration B′(w′, n,m).
It is not hard to find that the E[Si(w)] ≥ E[Si(w′)] for all 1 ≤ i ≤ m suggests
that the variation of expected counter values across all counters of the B(w, n,m)
is larger than that of the B′(w′, n,m). Let Vmax be the maximum counter value,
and Vatk be the value of the counter randomly assigned to the attack flow fatk
(Vatk does not count the traffic of fatk). The higher the variation, the larger the
expected Vmax − Vi, thus the harder for RLFD to correctly select the counter of
fatk for the next level.
Therefore, the B(w, n,m) is the worst legitimate flow configuration for RLFD
to detect large flows. 
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Fig. 11: RLFD’s single-level detection probability of the 1st level against a large
flow at different rate Ratk = αγ, when background legitimate flows at various
rates (0.01γ, 0.1γ, and γ) fully use the link capacity of 1000γ. The RLFD suffers
the lowest detection probability when the legitimate flows are at the threshold rate
γ.
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B.4 Numeric Analysis For RLFD Detection Probability
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Fig. 12: The probability Pworst(m,n, α) when n full-use legitimate flows (at rate
of γ), m counters, and a large flow at the rate of Ratk = α · γ.
Numeric analysis for single-level detection. For each theoretical result,
we show numeric examples in the scenario of nγ = 10
5 and m = 100, a even more
memory-limited setting than the one in the complexity analysis (Section 4.4).
Title Suppressed Due to Excessive Length 37
α  = R
atk/γ
0 500 1000
O
ve
ru
se
 D
am
ag
e 
(M
B)
1
2
3
4
5
6
θ = 1.0
Worst-case
Upper bound
EARDet θγh
(a) θ = 1.0 (Flat)
α  = R
atk/γ
0 500 1000
O
ve
ru
se
 D
am
ag
e 
(M
B)
2
4
6
8
10
θ=0.5, θ Tb >= 2Tc
(1)
Worst-case
Upper bound
EARDet θγh
(b) θ = 0.5, θTb ≥ 2T (1)c
α  = R
atk/γ
0 500 1000
O
ve
ru
se
 D
am
ag
e 
(M
B)
2
4
6
8
10
θ=0.25, θ Tb >= 2Tc
(1)
Worst-case
Upper bound
EARDet θγh
(c) θ = .25, θTb ≥ 2T (1)c
α  = R
atk/γ
0 500 1000
O
ve
ru
se
 D
am
ag
e 
(M
B)
100
200
300
400
500
θ=0.5, θ Tb < 2Tc
(1)
Worst-case
Upper bound
EARDet θγh
(d) θ = 0.5, θTb < 2T
(1)
c
α  = R
atk/γ
0 500 1000
O
ve
ru
se
 D
am
ag
e 
(M
B)
100
200
300
400
500
θ=0.25, θ Tb < 2Tc
(1)
Worst-case
Upper bound
EARDet θγh
(e) θ = .25, θTb < 2T
(1)
c
Fig. 13: Twin-RLFD worst-case expected overuse damage E(Dover) (in MBytes)
and its upper bound for flat/bursty flows in various duty cycles θ, burst periods
Tb, and average rates Ratk = αγ, in the 40 Gbps link with threshold rate γ = 400
Kbps (nγ = 10
5 full-use legitimate flows at most). The Twin-RLFD has a limited
memory of m = 100 counters (50 counters for each RLFD), a typical number
of levels d = 4, and detection cycle T
(1)
c = 0.1 sec, T
(2)
c = 7.92 sec for two
RLFDs respectively. Flows at the EARDet detectable rate Ratk ≥ θγh = θ nγm+1γ
are detected by the EARDet with m = 100 counters in nearly zero damage.
Figures 12(a) to 12(j) comprehensively shows the simulated worst-case detec-
tion probability Pworst(m,n, α) in a level and its lower bound for various number
of full-use legitimate flows n ≤ nγ (50 to 105). We also give the numeric results
with different m (100 and 1000) for comparison. When n = 105,m = 100, we
can see α0.5 = 152 and α1.0 = 303, which are far smaller than EARDet’s lowest
detectable α = ργ(m+1) =
nγ
m+1 = 991. For RLFD, the α with actual worst-
case detection probability of 0.5 and 1.0 are around 75 and 150, respectively,
which are much lower than the α0.5 and α1.0. Thus, it suggests RLFD’s ability
of detecting low-rate large flows. The figures also show that the probability of
detecting low-rate flows increases as the number of flows (n) decreases or the
number of counters (m) increases. The figures show that the α0.5, α1.0, and
the lower bound holds for n > m, because we derive it with the assumption of
n m logm. When n ≤ m, RLFD has 100% detection probability as explained
in Section 4,
Since α1.0 decreases rapidly when n decreases, we approximate the total
detection probability by the detection probability of the first few levels.
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Numeric analysis for total detection probability. In a tough scenario
with nγ = 10
5, m = 100, and n = 107 legitimate flows in a link during one
detection cycle (around a second), RLFD has at least 0.25 and 1.0 probability
to detect a flat large flow with α = 152 and 303, respectively; and the simulation
results suggest that RLFD can detect a large flow with α = 75 and 150 with
probability around 0.25 and 1.0, respectively. Again, EARDet can only guarantee
to detect α ≥ ργ(m+1) = nγm+1 = 991. That is, RLFD outperforms the exact
detection algorithm on low-rate large flows.
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Fig. 14: RLFD Total Detection Probability. nγ = n = 10
5, m = 100.
Figure 14 shows an example of simulated worst-case total detection proba-
bility Pr(Aα) and its theoretical lower bound (Theorem 3), when n = nγ = 10
5
and m = 100. The lower bound holds for the most of α, except some very small
ones whose Pr(Aα) is close to 0.
B.5 Numeric Analysis For Twin-RLFD Theoretical Overuse
Damage
Figures 13(a) to 13(e) show the expected overuse damage E(Dover) calculated
in the worst case and its upper bound from Theorem 4, in a 40 Gbps link with
threshold rate γ = 400 Kbps (nγ = 10
5 full-use legitimate flows at most). The
Twin-RLFD has m = 50 counters for each RLFD, d = 4 levels, and detection
cycle T
(1)
c = 0.1 sec and T
(2)
c = 7.92 sec for two RLFDs, respectively. Damages
by large flows with various duty cycles θ and burst periods Tb are shown. Flows
with an average rate Ratk higher than θγh (black dash line) will be detected
instantly by EARDet (with 100 counters) with nearly zero damage.
The Twin-RLFD has d = 4 so that the number of virtual counters in the
RLFD bottom level (md = 504 = 6.25× 106) is larger than the number of flows.
Therefore, we the flows selected to the bottom level is fewer than the counters,
and RLFD can track each flow individually in the bottom level.
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We set T
(1)
c = Tc = 0.1 sec around
β
γ =
2×1514
400Kbps = 0.06 sec (β is usually a
few times of maximum packet size 1514 Bytes, so that bursty flows are easier
to catch). If Tc  β/γ, it is hard for a large flow to reach burst threshold; if
Tc  β/γ, the detection delay is too long, resulting in excessive damage.
For Twin-RLFD’s second RLFD, T
(2)
c =
2dγh
αγ T
(1)
c = 7.92 sec (according to
Theorem 4). Therefore, Twin-RLFD can guarantee detection for the worst-case
bursty flows (θTb < 2T
(1)
c ) at rate Ratk ≥ αγ = 100γ. We can guarantee detec-
tion of lower rate flows with worst-case burstiness by increasing T
(2)
c ; however,
increased T
(2)
c increases the damage caused by worst-case bursty flows. We say
bursty flows with θTb < 2T
(1)
c are the worst-case bursty flows, because such flows
are unlikely showing up in every level of the RLFD with cycle (T
(1)
c ), so that we
have to use the RLFD with longer detection cycle (T
(2)
c ) to catch those flows,
which requires longer delay, thus higher damage. Furthermore, such worst-case
flows can inflict more damage by increasing θ (thus the average rate), but remain
undetectable by EARDet. As discussed in Section 4.6, we can use choose differ-
ent T
(2)
c randomly in different cycles to prevent attackers from deterministically
maximizing damage.
A hybrid scheme consisting of EARDet and Twin-RLFD can limit the worst-
case damage caused by flat flows (θ = 1) and bursty flows (θ < 1). Specifically,
for flows with an average rate larger than 30γ (i.e. 12 Mbps), the damage is
as low as tens of MBytes (less than ten MBytes for flat flows). We admit that
Twin-RLFD cannot limit the damage for flows at extremely low rate ( 30γ)
as effectively as for other flows, however other existing schemes cannot neither,
because of the limited memory. For flows at high rates, although the Twin-RLFD
detects them with almost 100% probability in one detect cycle, it requires at least
one cycle to finish detection, hence the damage increases linearly with the flow
rate.
Twin-RLFD and EARDet complement each other. Twin-RLFD can detect
flows with an average rate lower than θγh but it incompetent at detecting high-
rate flows, whereas EARDet is the opposite.
C Proof Sketches
C.1 Proof Sketch For RLFD Single-level Detection Probability
Proof sketch of Theorem 2 In the analysis, we treat hashing flows into
counters as uniformly assigning n legitimate flows into counters and pick a
counter for the large flow fatk at random. We denote the random variable of
the maximum number of legitimate flows assigned to a counter as Y and the
random variable of the number of legitimate flows in the counter of the large
flow fatk as X.
Because the RLFD pick the counter with the largest value for the next level,
thus as long as the value of the large-flow counter (Ratk +X · γ)T is higher than
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the value of the maximum-value legitimate counter Y ·γT , the large-flow counter
will be picked, where T is the time length of the level. Then we get
Pworst(m,n, α) =Pr(Ratk +X · γ − Y · γ > 0)
=Pr(Y −X < α)
=
∑
y
Pr(y −X < α|Y = y) · Pr(Y = y)
(10)
As we discussed in Section B.3, the distributions of X and Y are the same
as those of the Xb and Yb in a single-weight balls-into-bins game with n balls
and m bins, where the Xb is the random variable of the number of balls in a
randomly picked bin, and the Yb is the random variables of the maximum number
of balls in a counter. Thus, we can apply Theorem 7 (by Raab and Steger [34])
to calculate the ymax, the upper bound of Y at high probability.
Theorem 7. Raab and Steger’s Theorem 1. Let Y be the random variable
that counts the maximum number of balls in any bin, if we throw n balls inde-
pendently and uniformly at random into m bins. Then Pr(Y > ymax) = o(1), if
ymax =
n
m + λ
√
2 nm log n, λ > 1, m logm  n ≤ m · ploylog(m), and n is very
large. When n→∞, o(1)→ 0.
We think it is a good approximation to our large-flow problem. Because the
number of legitimate flows n in a backbone link is more than a million, while the
number of counters m is quite limited (e.g. one thousand counters in L1 cache),
thus we say m logm n ≤ m · ploylog(m) 11 and n is very large. We derive the
approximate lower bound of Pworst(m,n, α) as follows:
Pworst(m,n, α) =
∑
y
Pr(y −X < α|Y = y) · Pr(Y = y)
=
∑
y≤ymax
Pr(X > y − α, Y = y) +
∑
y>ymax
Pr(X > y − α, Y = y)
≥
∑
y≤ymax
Pr(X > ymax − α, Y = y) +
∑
y>ymax
Pr(X > y − α, Y = y)
= Pr(X > ymax − α) · Pr(Y ≤ ymax) +
∑
y>ymax
Pr(X > y − α, Y = y)
(11)
We prove that the second part is o(1) as follows,∑
y>ymax
Pr(X > y − α, Y = y) ≤
∑
y>ymax
Pr(X > ymax − α, Y = y)
= Pr(X > ymax−α) · Pr(Y > ymax−α)
= Pr(X > ymax−α) · o(1) = o(1)
(12)
11 Raab et al. also provides a similar ymax for m(logm)
3  n, but it is enough to only
discuss one of them for an approximate result.
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According to Equation 11 and 12, we get
Pworst(m,n, α) ≥ Pr(X > ymax − α) · Pr(Y ≤ ymax) + o(1)
= Pr(X > ymax − α) · [1− Pr(Y > ymax)] + o(1)
= Pr(X > ymax − α) · (1− o(1)) + o(1)
= Pr(X > ymax − α)− o(1)
≈ Pr(X > ymax − α)
(13)
Therefore, when n is large, we approximately have Pworst(m,n, α) ≥ Pr(X >
ymax − α).
We let η = dymax − αe, and use random variable Mk to denote the number
of bins exactly contain k balls. We calculate Pr(X > ymax − α) as follows,
Pr(X > ymax − α)
= Pr(X > η) =
∑
k≥η
Pr(X = k)
=
∑
k≥η
∑
0≤mk≤m
Pr(X = k|Mk = mk) · Pr(Mk = mk)
=
∑
k≥η
∑
0≤mk≤m
mk
m
Pr(Mk = mk)
=
∑
k≥η
1
m
∑
0≤mk≤m
mkPr(Mk = mk) =
∑
k≥η
E(Mk)
m
=
∑
η≤k≤n
1
m
·m
(
n
k
)
(m− 1)n−k
mn
=
∑
η≤k≤n
(
n
k
)(
1− 1
m
)n−k(
1
m
)k
(14)
The above result requires to calculate the sum of the last m−η+1 items from
the binomial distribution B(n, 1m ). As we know, there is no simple, closed forms
for Equation 14. According to the law of rare events [8], binomial distribution
B(n, p) is approximate to Poisson distribution Pois(np), when n is large and p
is small. According to Equation 19, the detection probability Pr(Aα) is mainly
related to non-bottom levels in which the number of flows nis large (n > m) , and
p = 1m is small because m is around hundreds to thousands, we approximately
treat B(n, 1m ) as the Poisson distribution Pois(
n
m ), then we have(
n
k
)(
1− 1
m
)n−k(
1
m
)k
≈ e
− n
m ( n
m
)k
k!
(15)
, which is the probability of the item happens k times in the Poisson distribution.
Then, the Equation 14 turns to
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Pr(X > ymax − α) =
∑
η≤k≤n
(
n
k
)(
1− 1
m
)n−k(
1
m
)k
=
∑
η≤k≤n
e−
n
m ( n
m
)k
k!
= 1−Q(η − 1, n
m
)
(16)
, where Q(K, nm ) is the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of the Poisson
distribution Pois( nm ), i.e. sum of probabilities for 0 ≤ k ≤ K. As the Theorem 7
holds when λ > 1, thus we choose λ → 1+, thus ymax = nm +
√
2 nm log n.
Because we focus on how does the probability lower bound change along with
the m and n, the λ does not matter much here. Therefore, we proved that the
1 − Q(K, nm ) is an approximate lower bound for Pworst(m,n, α), where K =
η − 1 = ⌊ nm +√2 nm log n− α⌋. 
Proof sketch of Corollary 1. According to Theorem 2, Pworst(m,n, α0.5) >
1−Q(K, nm ) approximately, where K =
⌊
n
m+
√
2 nm log n−α0.5
⌋
. As the median12
ν of the Poisson distribution Pois( nm ) is bounded by
n
m − log 2 ≤ ν < nm + 13
[10]. Thus, ν ≈ nm , then
K ≈ n
m
⇒ α0.5 ≈
√
2
n
m
logn (17)
Therefore the Corollary 1 is proved.
Proof sketch of Corollary 2. According to Pearson’s Skewness Coeffi-
cients [39], the symmetry of a distribution is measured by its skewness. The
probability distribution is approximately symmetrical to its mean when the skew-
ness is small. According to [40], the skewness of Poisson distribution Pois( nm ) is(
n
m
)−0.5
. Thus when n  m logm the Pois( nm ) is approximately symmetrical
to its mean nm .
Because when α = 1 the actual Pworst(m,n, α) should be
1
m ≈ 0 (because
the large flow rate is the same as the legitimate flow rate, thus the detection
equals to randomly picking one from m counters), thus the approximate lower
bound 1−Q(Kα=1, nm ) ≈ 0, where Kα=1 =
⌊
n
m +
√
2 nm log n− 1
⌋
. As Pois( nm )
is symmetrical to Ks =
n
m , when K = Ks + (Ks − Kα=1) ≈ nm −
√
2 nm log n
, the 1 − Q(K, nm ) ≈ 1, in which α ≈ 2α0.5 (according to Corollary 1). Thus,
α1.0 = 2α0.5 has been proved.
C.2 Proof Sketch For RLFD Total Detection Probability
Proof sketch of Theorem 3. For the detection level k, we use Ak,α to denote
the event that the counter containing the large flow fatk with average rate of
Ratk = αγ in the level k is selected for the next level, where γ is the threshold
rate, α > 1. Then the total probability for RLFD to catch the large flow fatk in
one detection cycle is
12 The K such that the CDF Q(K, n
m
) = 0.5
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Pr(Aα) =Pr(A1,α, A2,α, A3,α, ..., Ad,α)
=Pr(A1,α) · Pr(A2,α|A1,α) · Pr(A3,α|A2,α, A1,α)·
...P r(Ad,α|Ad−1,α, ..., A1,α)
=Pr(A1,α) · Pr(A2,α|A1,α) · Pr(A3,α|A2,α)·
...P r(Ad,α|Ad−1,α)
(18)
As we described in Section 4.3, we use the Cuckoo hashing in the bottom level
d to randomly assign flows into counters. Because we set enough levels to make
the input flows in the bottom level less than the counters, the Pr(Ad,α|Ad−1,α) ≈
1. For the levels k < d with n(k) legitimate flows, according to Theorem 2 the
Pr(Ak,α|Ak−1,α) ≥ Pworst(m,n(k), α). Considering the maximum number of full-
use legitimate flows in a link is nγ = ρ/γ,
– When n < nγ , Pr(Ak,α|Ak−1,α) ≥ Pworst(m,n(k), α)
– When n ≥ nγ , Pr(Ak,α|Ak−1,α) ≥ Pworst(m,nγ , α)
Therefore,
Pr(Aα) ≥
d−1∏
k=1
Pworst(m,min(nγ , n
(k)), α) (19)
, where we approximately let n(k) = n/mk−1, which is the average value of n(k)
over repeated detection. n is the number of legitimate flows in the link.
According to Equation 19 and the fact that α1.0 decreases fast as the n
(k)
decreases by the factor of m, Pworst(m,n
(k), α) for n(k) < nγ does not affect
the product much for the most of α values. Therefore, we can approximate
Prworst(Aα) as follows:
Pr(Aα) ≥

∏
{k|n(k)≥nγ}
Pworst(m,nγ , α), when n ≥ nγ
Pworst(m,n, α) , when n < nγ
(20)
, where size of {k|n(k) ≥ nγ} is blogm(n/nγ)c+ 1, because n(k) = n(k−1)/m.
According to Theorem 2, approximately Pworst(m,n, α) ≥ 1−Q(K, nm ) where
K =
⌊
n
m +
√
2 nm log n−α
⌋
. Thus we can derive Theorem 3 from Equation 20.
C.3 Proof Sketch For Twin-RLFD Theoretical Overuse Damage
The upper bound of the expected overuse damage can be derived from the av-
erage rate of a flat large flow and the expected detection delay: E(Dover) ≤
E(Tdelay) · Ratk, because attack flows cannot cause more overuse damage than
the amount of traffic over-sent E(Tdelay) ·Ratk. For a bursty flow with duty cycle
θ and burst period Tb, a RLFD can also treat it as a flat flow at the time of each
burst interval θTb. Thus, we can still use the detection probability for flat flows
to calculate the damage for bursty flows.
Lemma 2 and proof sketch.
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Lemma 2. A RLFD with detection cycle Tc can detect bursty flows with θTb ≥
2Tc with the expected overuse damage:
E(Dover) ≤

Tcγα/θ
(
1−Q(Kγ , nγ
m
)
)blogm(n/nγ)c+1
, when n ≥ nγ
Tcγα/θ
(
1−Q(K, n
m
))
)
, when n < nγ
(21)
where Kγ =
⌊nγ
m +
√
2
nγ
m log nγ − αθ
⌋
, K =
⌊
n
m +
√
2 nm log n− αθ
⌋
, and Q(x, λ)
is the CDF of the Poisson distribution Pois(λ).
Proof sketch: Because θTb ≥ 2Tc, thus for each burst period Tb there are
must be at least
⌊
θTb
Tc
− 1⌋ detection cycles, in which RLFD can see the attack
traffic in all levels. When the RLFD observes the bursty flow, the only difference
from the detection over flat flow is that, the traffic rate at that moment is αθ γ,
instead of αγ in the case of flat flows. Thus, the probability Pr(Aα) to detect
such bursty flow in one detection cycle is calculated as the one for flat flow
detection in Theorem 3, by replacing the α with the αθ .
The expected detection delay E(Tdelay) is derived as follows:
E(Tdelay) ≤ 1Pr(Aα)
Tb⌊
θTb
Tc
− 1⌋ ≈ TcθPr(Aα) (22)
Then we get the over-sent attack traffic in the input link is E(Tdelay) ·Ratk, and
the overused bandwidth by attack traffic is less than or equal to that, because
the some attack packets may also be dropped during congestion. Thus we get
the expected overuse damage E(Dover):
E(Dover) ≤ E(Tdelay) ·Ratk ≤ Tcγα/θPr(Aα) (23)
Thus, according to Theorem 3, we get the upper bound of the overuse damage
in the Lemma 2. The proof also holds when θ = 1, which is for the case of flat
flows. 
Proof sketch of Theorem 4. The overuse damage in the case of θTb ≥ 2T (1)c
are from Lemma 2. When θTb < 2T
(1)
c and Ratk < θγh, we prove the damage as
follows:
Tb <
2T
(1)
c
θ
<
2T
(1)
c
Ratk
γh =
2T
(1)
c
αγ
γh =
T
(2)
c
d
(24)
Thus the Tb is less than a detection level period of the EFD
(2), which means the
bursty flow is like a flat flow to EFD(2). Therefore, we use the overuse damage
upper bound in Lemma 2, when θ = 1, Tc = T
(2)
c , and we get
E(Dover) ≤

T (2)c γα/
(
1−Q(Kγ , nγ
m
)
)blogm(n/nγ)c+1
, when n ≥ nγ
T (2)c γα/
(
1−Q(K, n
m
))
)
, when n < nγ
(25)
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where Kγ =
⌊nγ
m +
√
2
nγ
m log nγ −α
⌋
, K =
⌊
n
m +
√
2 nm log n−α
⌋
. By replacing
T
(2)
c with
2γh
αγ T
(1)
c , we proved the Theorem 2.
D Additional Table
Table 4: Settings of RLFD and CLEF
m 20 40 70 100 150 200 400
T ∗` .242 .242 .242 .242 .242 .242 .242
Single RLFD
d 4 3 3 3 3 3 2
T ∗c .968 .726 .726 .726 .726 .726 .484
Twin-RLFD (in CLEF)
d 7 5 4 4 4 3 3
T
(1)∗
c 1.69 1.21 .968 .968 .968 .726 .726
T
(2)∗
c 168.6 63.75 31.92 26.56 21.96 10.68 7.59
∗ Time unit is second.
